Soon after, Mr. Nehru became aware that Pakistan was likely to form an alliance with the United States and receive military aid from that country. In lengthy correspondence with Mohammad Ali, he strongly protested, suggesting that if Pakistan continued with the project, its Kashmir deal would be destroyed. [ii] Mr. Mohammad Ali replied that he did not understand why any military support that the UNITED States might provide to Pakistan for purely defensive purposes should make it less burdensome to improve Indo-Pakistani relations by settling the Kashmir dispute. In particular, he does not understand why Pakistan, if it joins an alliance with the United States, would disqualify the people of Kashmir from exercising their right – which the United Nations, India and Pakistan had recognised – to a free vote to decide whether their state, India or Pakistan, should join. Josef A. Kechichian, « CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION, » Encyclopaedia Iranica, V/3, pp. 259-260, available online at www.iranicaonline.org/articles/central-treaty-organization-cento-a-mutual-defense-and-economic-cooperation-pact-among-persia-turkey-and-pakistan-wi (accessed December 30, 2012). The British and American defence agreements led to the creation of the Standing Group of Army Deputies (PMDG), which oversaw a number of economic activities through a special committee, including the completion of rail and telecommunications links between the three regional states. The PMDG, composed of five senior officers representing the Military Committee, was tasked with discussing military issues in the Persian Gulf and northern regions and providing direction to the Combined Military Planning Team (Europe, p. 146). CENTO showed great interest in subversion activities that were thought to have come from the Soviet Union and therefore supported co-subversion activities (Ramazani, 1966, pp.
120-21). But it has failed to meet the real security needs of its members. In September 1965, for example, Pakistan invoked the treaty as part of its war with India. Persia and Turkey provided verbal support, while Britain and the United States opted for neutrality (Ramazani, 1975, pp. 339-42). .